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Objectives: The Attribution Model of mental illness stigma posits that attributions about the 
causes and controllability of mental illness contribute to prejudicial emotional reactions, which 
in turn may lead to discriminatory behaviors towards people with mental illnesses. Given that 
people make different assumptions about different mental illnesses, if this model is correct, it 
suggests that specific diagnoses would elicit different types of stigma. Another important, but 
unexamined, predictor is extrinsic religious orientation, which correlates positively with other 
types of prejudice and may predict higher levels of mental illness stigma. The purpose of this 
study was to test the Attribution Model of stigma and examine the relationships between 
diagnosis, religious orientation, and stigma.  
Methods: Participants (n = 334) were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk, randomized to 
read one of three vignettes about a person with a mental illness (i.e., schizophrenia, anorexia 
nervosa, depression), and completed measures of mental illness stigma, religious orientation and 
affiliation, familiarity with mental illness, and authoritarianism. Using latent variable path 
analysis, analysis of covariance, and multiple regression analyses, relationships in the Attribution 
Model of mental illness stigma were assessed, as well as the impact of diagnosis and extrinsic 
religiosity on specific aspects of stigma as measured by the Attribution Questionnare-27 
subscales (i.e., blame, anger, pity, danger/fear, avoidance, segregation, and coercion).   
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Results: Assessment of the Attribution Model indicated moderate overall model fit after 
respecification. Path coefficients indicated strong relationships between variables that were 
generally consistent with paths predicted by the model. One notable exception was that feelings 
of pity were not associated with greater helping behaviors. Analysis of covariance suggested that 
diagnosis was a key predictor of stigma, and that schizophrenia was the most stigmatized. 
Multiple regression analyses revealed that extrinsic religiosity was also an important predictor of 
stigma; extrinsic religiosity appeared to increase certain types of stigma, and moderate the 
relationship between diagnosis and stigma overall.  
Discussion: Although the respecified Attribution Model fit the data fairly well, the findings 
suggest that either the scale or the model would benefit from further refinement. Results support 
prior evidence that severe mental illnesses like schizophrenia are more stigmatized than other 
diagnoses. Extrinsic religiosity was also predictive of increased stigma, both directly and 
indirectly. As a moderator, extrinsic religiosity may decrease the impact of diagnosis on stigma, 
raising stigma for diagnoses perceived as more “controllable” (i.e., anorexia nervosa, depression) 
such that levels were similar to schizophrenia. Limitations and suggestions for future research 
are discussed.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1960’s, mental health service providers, researchers, and advocates have 
attempted to educate and engage the American public in an effort to eliminate stereotypes about 
and discrimination against people with mental illness (Goffman, 1986). Their work has produced 
numerous nonprofit organizations, anti-stigma campaigns, and a significant body of research. As 
a result of these efforts, members of the American public today are frequently exposed to 
depictions of people living with specific mental illnesses in media and popular culture (although 
these representations are not always accurate), and access to mental health care in the United 
States has somewhat improved (Hinshaw & Cicchetti, 2000; Mark, Levit, Vandivort-Warren, 
Buck, & Coffey, 2011; Phelan, Link, Stueve, & Pescosolido, 2000). Still, people diagnosed with 
mental illnesses today experience stigma and social rejection in a diverse range of environments, 
including work, daily social interaction, and healthcare (Cechnicki, Angermeyer, & Bielańska, 
2011; Penn, Kommana, Mansfield, & Link, 1999; Pescosolido, Medina, Martin, & Long, 2013; 
Teachman, Wilson, & Komarovskaya, 2006).  
When we write about public stigma associated with mental illness, it is essential to 
recognize that stereotypes and discrimination differ according to the specific diagnosis in 
question. Research indicates that assumptions about people diagnosed with anorexia nervosa 
differ significantly from assumptions about people with schizophrenia, for example (Crisafulli, 
Thompson-Brenner, Franko, Eddy, & Herzog, 2010). People diagnosed with severe mental 
illnesses such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder also appear to elicit the greatest quantity of 
stigma, as compared to more common illnesses like major depressive disorder (Corrigan et al., 
2003; Corrigan et al., 2001; Crisp et al., 2000; Loch et al., 2014; Mestdagh & Hansen, 2013; 
Stewart, Keel, & Schiavo, 2006). The source of differences in stigma by diagnosis may be 
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explained by differential attributions that members of the public make about certain mental 
illness diagnoses, as explained in the Attribution Model of stigma (Corrigan et al., 2003).  
One area of research in public stigma has examined how stereotypes about mental illness 
vary across demographic factors and cultural groups (e.g., race, gender, familiarity with mental 
illness, professional training) (Anglin, Link, & Phelan, 2006; Rao, Feinglass, & Corrigan, 2007). 
Strategies for ameliorating public stigma have included tailoring anti-stigma interventions to 
specific groups, e.g., criminal justice professionals or students in professional programs 
(Corrigan, Morris, Michaels, Rafacz, & Rüsch, 2012). It is possible that modifying anti-stigma 
interventions according to the specific beliefs of certain groups would improve the outcomes of 
anti-stigma campaigns. Among these groups might be religiously-affiliated people; existing 
research suggests that Christian religious beliefs are associated with negative beliefs about 
mental illnesses (Wesselmann & Graziano, 2010). Religious belief and adherence to religion 
varies widely, even among American Christians, and it is possible that individuals’ motivation to 
be involved with organized religion has a relationship to their endorsement of public stigma. For 
example, among American Christians, extrinsic religious orientation (a type of motivation) has 
previously been correlated with prejudice toward racial, sexual, and other minorities (Johnson, 
Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2012). Below, I review current research on public mental illness stigma, the 
Attribution Model, and ways in which diagnosis and religious orientation might affect public 
mental illness stigma.  
Mental illness stigma  
Stigma can be defined broadly as composed of four co-occurring constructs: 1) the 
labeling of an out-group, 2) endorsement of stereotypes and negative attributions about that 
group, 3) perceived separation and difference from the now-stigmatized group, and 4) this 
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labeling and separation then leads to status loss and discrimination (Link & Phelan, 2001). 
Mental illness stigma is multidimensional and includes public stigma, self-stigma, and courtesy 
stigma. This research will address public stigma, defined as the prejudice against mental illness 
and discrimination against people with mental illnesses endorsed by the general population, 
which in turn affects an individual person (Corrigan, Markowitz, Watson, Rowan, & Kubiak, 
2003). Public stigma itself is multifaceted. The endorsement of specific stereotypes and negative 
attributions about mental illness depend upon the mental illness diagnosis in question and may 
include assumptions about dangerousness or responsibility for one’s illness.  
Corrigan and colleagues (2003) have developed the Attribution Model of mental illness 
stigma, one of the most-researched conceptualizations of the causes of mental illness stigma. 
They postulate that attributions about the causes, controllability, and dangerousness of a mental 
illness influence the public’s beliefs about personal responsibility for an illness, which then 
influence emotional responses and discriminatory or helping behavior; see Figure 1 for a 
hypothesized model of these relationships. Studies examining the Attribution Model find that 
beliefs about the cause of mental illness and perceptions of dangerousness predict discriminatory 
responses (e.g., the unwillingness to help or hire those with mental illnesses) and support for 
coercive treatment in institutional settings (Corrigan et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2014). Therefore, in 
the current study, I hypothesize that increasing perceptions of dangerousness will lead to greater 
fear, which will in turn lead to decreases in desires to help people with mental illness, increasing 
avoidance behavior, and increasing support for coercive treatment. Corrigan and colleagues 
(2003) also find that beliefs about controllability impact beliefs about a person’s responsibility 
for their mental illness (e.g., if someone is believed to be more in control of their mental illness, 
they are also held more responsible for the symptoms). For these reasons, in the current study I 
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hypothesize that perceptions of greater blame (i.e., perceiving that the person in the vignette is to 
blame for their own illness) will lead to decreases in pity, and corresponding increases in anger 
and fear, which will in turn lead to increasing support social segregation from people with mental 
illnesses.  
Factors that predict stigma 
Given the centrality of stereotypes about mental illness in the Attribution Model, it is 
likely that people will endorse different levels and kinds of stigma when confronted with 
different types of mental illnesses. In particular, severe mental illnesses (mental disorders that 
have a substantial impact on daily functioning and/or lead to hospitalization, most often 
including schizophrenia and bipolar disorders) appear to be most subject to public stigma 
(Corrigan et al., 2003; Corrigan et al., 2001; Crisp et al., 2000; Loch et al., 2014; Mestdagh & 
Hansen, 2013; Stewart, Keel, & Schiavo, 2006).  In the current study, I hypothesize that 
schizophrenia will elicit greater perceptions of dangerousness and subsequent fear, leading to 
greater avoidance of and desire for segregation from people with schizophrenia. In measures of 
overall stigma, I hypothesize that schizophrenia will be more highly stigmatized than anorexia 
nervosa, which will be more highly stigmatized than depression. Supporting my hypotheses, 
previous research has found that people with schizophrenia are generally perceived as more 
dangerous than people with other mental illnesses, particularly diagnoses that do not involve the 
experience of psychosis (Loch et al., 2014). Other research has shown that schizophrenia elicits 
more negative opinions than depression, eating disorders, or panic attacks, and that the public 
believes that people with schizophrenia are less likely to recover from their illness than people 
with other mental illnesses (Crisp et al., 2000).  Evidence also suggests that people with 
schizophrenia are generally not perceived as in control of or responsible for their illnesses. On 
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the other hand, people with anorexia nervosa or depression are generally perceived as less 
dangerous, but more responsible for their own illnesses (Crisafulli et al., 2010; Stewart, Schiavo, 
Herzog, & Franko, 2008). Stewart and colleagues (2006) examined public perceptions of 
individuals diagnosed with anorexia nervosa as compared to people diagnosed with other mental 
or non-mental disorders. Their research found that participants anticipated more discomfort 
interacting with a person with schizophrenia as compared to people with anorexia nervosa, but 
that participants believed the person with anorexia nervosa was “better able to pull him/herself 
together if he/she wanted to,” was more to blame for his/her condition, and was acting this way 
for attention (Stewart et al., 2006). Given this research, in the current study I hypothesize that 
anorexia nervosa will elicit the greatest blame, leading to subsequent feelings of anger and 
endorsement of coercive treatment for their illness. On the other hand, given that participants 
may be most familiar with depression (in comparison with the other two mental illnesses) and 
familiarity with mental illness generally decreases stigma (Angermeyer, Matschinger, & 
Corrigan, 2004), I hypothesize that depression will elicit the greatest sense of pity and desire to 
help. 
 People from different cultural backgrounds appear to endorse different levels and types of 
public mental illness stigma. In the United States, Rao and colleagues (2007) have found that 
African Americans and Asian Americans are more likely than Caucasians to perceive people 
with mental illness as dangerous and tend to want more distance from them. Other research finds 
that although African Americans perceive people with mental illnesses as more likely to be 
dangerous, African Americans are also less likely to believe that individuals with mental illness 
should be blamed or punished for violent behavior (Anglin et al., 2006). Some researchers have 
also found evidence of gender differences in public mental illness stigma, but findings are not 
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consistent. Corrigan and colleagues (2003) found that males were more likely to believe that a 
hypothetical person with schizophrenia was “responsible” for his illness, and expressed less pity 
and more anger toward the hypothetical person with schizophrenia. However, in a large British 
survey of public opinions about people with one of 7 different mental illnesses, researchers 
found no significant differences between the opinions of men and women (Crisp et al., 2000). 
Finally, a broad body of previous research indicates that prejudicial attitudes about persons with 
mental illness are inversely related to familiarity, or knowledge and experience, with serious 
mental illness (Corrigan, Green, Lundin, Kubiak, & Penn, 2001; Holmes, Corrigan, Williams, 
Canar, & Kubiak, 1999; Penn et al., 1994). People who know someone with a severe mental 
illness may be less likely to perceive people with mental illnesses as dangerous, and may not 
desire as much social distance from people with mental illness (Penn et al., 1994).  Race, gender, 
and familiarity may be important factors to consider when examining predictors of stigma and 
will be examined as potential confounds in the current study.  
Religiosity  
Ways of measuring religiosity  
In contemporary research on psychology and religion, the terms “religion” and 
“religiosity” (synonymous with “religiousness”) refer primarily to fixed systems of beliefs and 
institutional and ideological commitments, e.g., membership in a particular Christian 
denomination, and the strength of participants’ belief or involvement in religion (Hill & 
Pargament, 2008). In contrast, “spirituality” is generally understood to refer to “humans’ search 
for meaning in life,” and while it may be related to religion for certain individuals (i.e., people 
who finding meaning in life through membership in a particular organized religion), spirituality 
may be unrelated to religion for other individuals (e.g., atheists) (Tanyi, 2002). In the present 
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research I focus on religiosity, because adherence to specific belief systems and membership in 
particular communities may be related to beliefs about members of stigmatized groups, 
particularly those with mental illnesses. 
Religiosity can be conceptualized along a number of domains, including affiliation with 
specific, organized religious belief systems, commitment to tenets of religious belief, and 
motivation to be involved with religious communities. Many researchers examining the link 
between religion and health have used global measures of religiosity, e.g., asking participants to 
identify their religious affiliation (Hill & Edwards, 2013). Perhaps the simplest commonly-used 
measure of religiosity is a single-item questionnaire about how often participants attend religious 
services (Hill & Pargament, 2008). Researchers have also defined and measured religiosity as 
participants’ perceived “closeness to God,” as their level of “religious commitment” (the degree 
to which a person adheres to their religious values and uses them in daily living), or as their 
motivation to be involved with religion – their “religious orientation” (Worthington et al., 2003; 
Zwingmann, Klein, & Büssing, 2011). Religious orientation is often used as an indicator of the 
intensity or centrality of religious belief in a person’s life, and helps capture the pervasiveness of 
religious influence in daily life (Williams, 2003). It is important to note that there is broad 
disagreement in the research literature about the best way to measure the importance of religion 
in daily life, or even about which aspects of religious belief (e.g., faith, participation in 
community, tradition) are most relevant to the research questions at hand. Below, and in the 
present research, I focus on religious orientation.  
Religious orientation 
Allport and Ross (1967) developed the concept of “religious orientation” in the context of 
measuring racial prejudice among American Christians. A person’s religious orientation 
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indicates the motivating forces behind their involvement in religion. Allport and Ross initially 
proposed two opposing poles of religious orientation: extrinsic religiosity and intrinsic 
religiosity. People with a highly extrinsic religious orientation see religion or membership in a 
religious community as a means to ends other than faith - that is, they find religion useful to 
provide security, solace, sociability, status, or self-justification. Conversely, people with a highly 
intrinsic religious orientation see religion as a means to express faith; these individuals 
internalize their chosen creed and endeavor to follow it fully. Today, researchers typically 
understand intrinsic and extrinsic orientations not as opposite poles but as differing dimensions, 
thus, extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity are not mutually exclusive; someone could be highly 
internally and externally oriented toward religion, or they could be low on both dimensions (e.g., 
if they were not religious). Religious orientation (as opposed to other measures of religiosity, 
e.g., closeness to God) may have an important theoretical relationship to stigma because it partly 
attempts to capture the social dimension of religious belief. For example, a highly extrinsic 
orientation to religion may indicate a desire to participate in communities that espouse a rigid set 
of social norms. Therefore, in these tight-knit communities, people who violate social norms 
(e.g., by exhibiting symptoms of mental illness) may be particularly ostracized.  
Extrinsic religious orientation and prejudice  
 Allport and Ross (1967) found that participants with a more extrinsic orientation toward 
religion demonstrated greater racial prejudice than people with a more intrinsic orientation. Since 
then, a number of studies have examined the correlates of religious orientation (Barrett, Patock-
Peckham, Hutchinson, & Nagoshi, 2005; Mak & Tsang, 2008; Maltby & Day, 2000; Sciarra & 
Gushue, 2003). A meta-analysis of religious orientation found that extrinsic religiosity was 
associated with negative characteristics (e.g., racial prejudice) and was not related to measures of 
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religious commitment; Intrinsic religiosity demonstrated no correlation with prejudice (Donahue, 
1985). In a more recent study, intrinsic religiosity was similarly found to be unrelated to 
discriminatory attitudes toward sexual or racial minorities (Kirkpatrick, 1993). Extrinsic 
religious orientation has been positively correlated with covert prejudicial beliefs towards 
members of minority racial groups, women, members of lower socioeconomic classes, and 
sexual minorities (Chambers, 2017). As noted by Donahue (1985), the vast majority of research 
on religion and prejudice has been conducted in primarily Christian, largely protestant 
populations (Flere & Lavrič, 2007).  
Religious orientation and stigma 
Unfortunately, there is little existing literature examining the relationship between 
religious orientation or religious affiliation and public stigma related to mental illness. 
Qualitative research with religious leaders (primarily Christian clergy) has indicated that many 
religious leaders espouse a mix of secular and religiously-based explanations and beliefs about 
mental illness, and that clergy often recognize a need to refer their congregants to mental health 
professionals (Conley & Wolfe, 2011; Little, 2013). However, these studies are limited by small 
sample sizes and snowball sampling methods, so it is possible that researchers are interviewing a 
biased sample. Literature on mental illness stigma among non-Christian religious groups in the 
United States is even more limited. In the Muslim-American community, existing literature 
suggests strong stigma against people with mental illness, particularly because of concerns with 
family social standing; disclosure of mental illness is considered “shameful” (Ciftci, 2012). 
Qualitative research with Pakistani Muslim and Afro-Caribbean Christian groups suggests that 
community stigma associated with mental illness has led to a preference for private coping 
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strategies (rather than seeking mental health services) among members of these groups 
(Cinnirella & Loewenthal, 1999).  
The strongest evidence for a link between religion and mental illness stigma comes from 
two exploratory studies on Christian religious beliefs about mental illness. Wesselmann and 
Graziano (2010) examined how Christian religious beliefs affect perceptions of people with 
mental illness. Their data suggests that Christian religious beliefs about mental illness focus on 
beliefs about sin and morality (e.g., “Moral weakness is the main cause of mental illness”) and 
spiritually-oriented causes and treatments (e.g., “Persons suffering from mental illnesses are 
being tormented by the devil”). Christian religious beliefs about mental illness were associated 
with negative attitudes about mental illness (e.g., “Many people with mental illnesses simply 
refuse to take responsibility for their lives”) and to other individual differences that predict 
prejudice toward stigmatized groups (e.g., religious fundamentalism, right wing 
authoritarianism). In a later study, Wesselmann and colleagues (2015) investigated how 
Christian religious beliefs about mental illness influenced the types of social support or treatment 
that individuals would be willing to endorse for people with mental illness. Their analysis found 
that a Christian belief that mental illness is caused by immorality and sinfulness and that mental 
illnesses have spiritual treatments predicted a preference for endorsing spiritual social support, 
e.g., praying together, recommending that a person see a spiritual leader for counseling (as 
opposed to recommending “secular” treatments like medication). Additionally, Christians who 
identified themselves as evangelical (as opposed to Roman Catholic or mainline Protestant) were 
more likely to believe that mental illnesses have spiritual causes and treatments, and were more 
likely to endorse a preference for spiritual social supports. Given that many of the religious 
beliefs about mental illness (e.g., “many people with mental illnesses simply refuse to take 
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responsibility for their lives,” “moral weakness is the main cause of mental illness”) had a central 
theme of controllability, in the current study I hypothesize that illnesses that are generally 
perceived to be more controllable (i.e., anorexia nervosa) would elicit more stigma from people 
with a highly extrinsic orientation to religion.  
The current study 
The current study has three primary aims. In aim one, I examine the Attribution Model of 
stigma via a confirmatory factor analysis of the attribution questionnaire used to measure mental 
illness stigma and a latent variable path analysis of the structural model suggested by the 
Attribution Model. See Figure 1 for a hypothesized model of these relationships, and Table 1 for 
a comprehensive list of my hypotheses across all aims. 
Aim two has two parts, in which I assess the impact of two important predictors of public 
stigma: 1) diagnosis and 2) religious orientation. For part one, given evidence that public beliefs 
about people with mental illnesses change according to the specific diagnosis, participants 
randomized to read vignettes based on diagnoses should have differing levels of stigma. For 
diagnoses perceived as more dangerous, I hypothesize that fear, avoidance, and segregation will 
also be elevated. For diagnoses perceived as more controllable or more to blame, I hypothesize 
that coercion and anger will also be elevated. While researchers have examined the specific 
stereotypes associated with particular diagnoses, few have compared overall levels of mental 
illness stigma across different diagnoses (Anderson, Jeon, Blenner, & Wiener, 2015; Corker et 
al., 2015; Krendl & Freeman, 2017) and none have examined all facets of the Attribution Model 
across different diagnoses.  
In the second part of aim two, I assess the role of extrinsic religiosity as a possible 
moderator of the relationship between specific diagnoses and different aspects of mental health 
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stigma. Overall, I hypothesize that illnesses that are perceived as more controllable (i.e., anorexia 
nervosa) will elicit greater stigma from people who have a highly extrinsic orientation towards 
religion. I also hypothesize that extrinsic religiosity will have a main effect on mental illness 
stigma, in that participants with higher extrinsic religiosity will report higher levels stigma across 
stigma subscales and diagnoses. See Figure 2 for a diagram of the hypothesized moderation. 
Aim three is exploratory, to further understand the role of religion in stigma. Research on 
intrinsic religiosity and religious coping suggests a positive relationship between intrinsic 
religiosity and well-being (Hackney & Sanders, 2003). I examine the possible relationships 
between intrinsic religiosity, extrinsic religiosity, and mental illness stigma using moderated 
moderation, that is, does high intrinsic religiosity moderate the hypothesized moderating effect 
of high extrinsic religiosity on the relationship between diagnosis and mental illness stigma? See 
Figure 3 for a diagram of the hypothesized moderated moderation. In addition, given that 
previous research has focused primarily on Christian religions, and some limited research has 
shown positive correlations between religious affiliation and prejudice (Chambers, 2017; Flere & 
Lavrič, 2007), I will examine the relationship between religious affiliation and stigma; I hope to 
explore other religious affiliations (e.g. Muslim, Jewish, Hindu) as well as Christianity. 
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METHODS 
Procedures 
This was a cross-sectional study using an experimental design in which participants were 
recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. After providing informed consent, participants were 
randomly assigned to a vignette about a person with a mental illness in which the diagnosis 
differed (i.e., schizophrenia, anorexia nervosa, or major depressive disorder) and then completed 
all measures via an online survey created in Qualtrics (Qualtrics, 2005). At the end of the survey, 
participants were assigned a code verifying their completion, and were paid $2.00. Participants 
whose responses passed attention checks were paid an additional $0.20. The survey was 
estimated to take between 10 – 20 minutes to complete, so compensation translates to roughly an 
$8.00 hourly wage.   
Participants 
All participants were required to be at least 18 years of age, reside in the United States, 
and speak English. For inclusion in the data analysis and in order to maintain data quality, 
participants were also required to pass checks for attention (e.g., questions prompting the 
participant to select “5” as the answer) and quality (i.e., asking participants to identify the mental 
illness diagnosis described in the vignette that they read) embedded in the Qualtrics survey. 
Existing research suggests that these quality checks are sufficient to gather quality data in MTurk 
research (Hauser & Schwarz, 2016; Kees, Berry, Burton, & Sheehan, 2017).  Of 410 total 
participants, 334 (81%) provided correct answers to attention and quality checks embedded 
within standard survey items. Analyses were performed on data from these 334 participants; of 
these, 114 were randomized to vignette about schizophrenia, 110 to the vignette about anorexia 
24 
 
 
nervosa, and 110 to the vignette about depression. Participants whose data passed manipulation 
and attention checks did not vary significantly by vignette; 9 (7%) surveys from participants who 
saw the vignette about schizophrenia were removed, 15 (12%) surveys from participants who 
saw the vignette about anorexia nervosa were removed, and 15 (12%) surveys from participants 
who saw the vignette about depression were removed.  
Measures  
Participants first answered brief demographic questions and completed measures of 
religious affiliation. Participants were then randomly assigned to read one of three vignettes 
before completing the Attribution Questionnaire (AQ-27). After completing the AQ-27, 
participants completed the remaining measures, i.e., the Social Distance Scale (SDS), Level of 
Contact Report (LOR), Age Universal Intrinsic-Extrinsic scale-12, and the Very Short 
Authoritarianism scale (VSA). Variables and the measures used to assess them are outlined 
below (full measures and their scoring procedures are included in Appendix 1):  
Independent variables 
Religious orientation 
Religious orientation was measured using the Age Universal I-E scale-12, a 12-item 
questionnaire designed to assess participants’ orientation toward religion (extrinsic, intrinsic, or 
both) (Maltby, 1999, 2002; Maltby & Lewis, 1996). The I-E scale has been used with both 
religious and non-religious people of all ages. Over time, versions of the I-E scale have been 
revised in order to refine the factor structure. The current scale has 12 items. For the current 
study, I have altered the language of the scale, replacing references to “church” with “religious 
services” in order to expand the measure to people adhering to non-Christian religions. Both 
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subscales of the Age Universal I-E scale-12 have good internal consistency in prior research 
(Intrinsic subscale  = 0.90, Extrinsic subscale  = 0.88; Maltby & Lewis, 1996) and in our 
sample (Intrinsic subscale  = 0.94, Extrinsic subscale  = 0.83). Previous research (Donahue, 
1985) has hypothesized three subscales, demarcating a difference between “extrinsic-social” 
(related to social activity in religious settings) items and “extrinsic-personal” items. In our 
sample, these items were highly correlated (r =.90) and were considered as one extrinsic 
subscale. 
Religious affiliation 
Participants identified their personal religious affiliation, e.g., “Orthodox Christian” 
“Protestant,” “Roman Catholic,” “Mormon,” “Jewish,” “Muslim,” “Hindu,” “Buddhist.” If 
participants did identify with any of the identified religions, they could select “Other” (and fill in 
an optional blank), “Agnostic,” or “Atheist.”  Participants who identified themselves as affiliated 
with any branch of Christianity were also asked to identify whether or not they considered 
themselves “evangelical.” 
Dependent variables 
Mental illness stigma 
Mental illness stigma was assessed using the Attribution Questionnaire. The AQ-27 is a 
27-item questionnaire that first presents a vignette involving a person living with mental illness, 
and then asks a series of questions measuring factors related to stigma based on an attributional 
model of stigma. The AQ-27 is scored on 9 subscales: blame, anger, pity, help, dangerousness, 
fear, avoidance, segregation, and coercion. The AQ-27 is theoretically driven (Corrigan, 
Markowitz, Watson, Rowan, & Kubiak, 2003; Pingani et al., 2012) and has been shown to be 
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reliable and valid (Corrigan & Watson, 2002; Pinto, Hickman, Logsdon, & Burant, 2012). In a 
sample of college students, the AQ-27 demonstrated good test-retest reliability across subscales 
(> .75), content validity through factor analysis, and convergent validity with measures of social 
distance (Brown, 2008). The original AQ-27 presents a vignette about a man (Harry) with 
schizophrenia, but I have modified the survey to present vignettes about a woman (Kim) with 
either schizophrenia, major depressive disorder, or anorexia nervosa. I chose to change the 
vignette to be about a woman because anorexia nervosa is stereotypically associated with women 
(whereas the other two diagnoses are generally perceived as more gender-neutral), and a man 
with anorexia nervosa might be more stigmatized by way of violating gender expectations 
(Griffiths, Mond, Murray, & Touyz, 2014). The vignettes are the same on all features except 
diagnosis. In our sample, the overall scale demonstrated excellent internal consistency ( = 
0.91), and each subscale demonstrated at least acceptable internal consistency (Blame  = .80, 
Anger  = .92, Pity  = .79, Help  = .82, Dangerousness  = .94, Fear  = .93, Avoidance  = 
.77, Segregation  = .92, Coercion  = .66).   
Social distance 
Desire for social distance from people with mental illness was measured using the 7-item 
Social Distance Scale (SDS), which asks participants to rate each item on a 1 to 4-point 
willingness scale. The sum of ratings equals social distance, with higher scores representing 
greater desire for distance from people with a mental illness. The SDS has good internal 
consistency ( = 0.75,  = 0.89 in our sample) and validity, correlating with the Dangerousness 
Scale (r =.46) (Penn et al., 1994) of the Attribution Questionnaire. This scale is often used as a 
proxy measure for behavioral indices of discrimination against people with mental illness. 
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Covariates 
In addition to race and gender, I included two scales in my analyses to control for potential 
confounding variables. 
Familiarity with mental illness 
 Given the role of familiarity with mental illness in predicting stigma, I included a 
measure of familiarity as a potential covariate in my analyses (Angermeyer et al., 2004). The 12-
item Level of Contact Report (LOR) lists 12 situations that vary in intimacy with persons with 
mental illness. These situations vary from least intimate contact (“I have observed, in passing, a 
person that I believe had a mental illness”), to medium intimacy (“I have worked with a person 
who had a severe mental illness at my place of employment”) to high intimacy (“I have a mental 
illness”). When the LOR was developed, the 12 situations were ranked in order of intimacy of 
contact. Inter-rater reliability for rank-order was high; the mean correlation between raters was 
.83 (Corrigan et al., 2001). A subsequent sample of 100 research participants validated the rank 
order (Holmes et al., 1999).  
Authoritarianism 
 Because extrinsic religiosity and prejudice toward outgroups have commonly been 
associated with authoritarianism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Wilkinson, 2004), we 
included a measure of authoritarianism as a potential covariate in our analyses. The Very Short 
Authoritarianism scale (VSA) is a 6-item scale designed to measure three aspects of 
authoritarianism: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism 
(Bizumic & Duckitt, 2018; Mavor, Louis, & Sibley, 2010). The VSA asks participants to 
indicate their level of agreement (from 1, “very strongly agree,” to 9, “very strongly disagree”) 
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with statements such as, “what our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our 
leaders in unity.” The VSA has demonstrated satisfactory internal consistency ( > .70), the 
expected three-factor structure, and convergent validity with the widely used 36-item Right 
Wing Authoritarianism scale (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2018). In our sample, the internal consistency 
of the VSA was good ( = 0.86). 
Analyses 
Preliminary analyses 
 To describe the participant sample, I computed frequency statistics of demographic 
variables (described below). In order to gauge baseline relationships between variables, I 
computed a Pearson’s correlation matrix and summary statistics of key variables see Tables 2 
and 3). 
Aim 1 
To test the Attribution Model of stigma as hypothesized in the existing literature and in 
the Attribution Questionnaire, I conducted path analysis with latent variables. Path analysis with 
latent variables makes a distinction between the structural relationship between latent variables 
and the measurement model of manifest indicators that make up these constructs. Multiple 
indicators are used for each latent variable; in this study, individual items of the AQ were used to 
indicate the latent constructs from their corresponding subscales. All models were conducted 
using MPLUS (Muthén & Muthén, 1998) and evaluated using Maximum Likelihood, which 
utilizes a mean-adjusted chi-square statistic that is robust to multivariate nonnormality. The 
tested models were covariance structure models. Missing data was minimal (13 observations) 
and was deleted listwise. My analyses followed the recommended two-step procedure (Anderson 
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& Gerbing, 1988); First, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to develop a measurement 
model that demonstrated acceptable fit with the data – that the AQ items fit into the latent 
constructs outlined in Figure 1. After fitting the measurement model with the data, causal paths 
between the latent variables (as hypothesized in Figure 1) were estimated. Using the 
modification indices available in MPLUS and based on existing theory around stigma, I 
iteratively respecified the measurement and path models to better fit the current data. Because 
the chi-square test is very sensitive to sample size and often rejects well-fitting models (Ullman 
& Bentler, 2012), three indices and their cutoff points were utilized to assess goodness of fit for 
all models: the comparative fit index (CFI; values of .95 or greater), the root-mean-square error 
of approximation (RMSEA; values of .07 or less) (Steiger, 2007), and the standardized root-
mean-square residual (SRMR; values of .08 or less) (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The bootstrap method 
was used to provide standard errors and significance tests for the indirect and total effects 
(Shrout & Bolger, 2002). 
Aim 2 
To examine the relationship between overall stigma and specific mental illness diagnoses, 
I conducted one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) predicting overall mental illness stigma 
from the specific diagnoses, schizophrenia, anorexia nervosa, and depression. Race, gender, 
familiarity with mental illness, and authoritarianism were included as covariates in each model. 
To examine the relationship between specific diagnoses and particular dimensions of stigma, I 
conducted separate ANCOVAs predicting each subscale (from the Attribution Questionnaire) as 
well as desired social distance (from the Social Distance Scale) from the specific diagnoses. The 
subscales of the Attribution Questionnaire are: blame, anger, pity, help, dangerousness, fear, 
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avoidance, segregation, and coercion. The predicted relationships between specific diagnoses 
and dimensions of mental illness stigma are depicted in Table 1.  
 To examine the relationship between religious orientation and overall mental illness 
stigma, I conducted moderation analyses using Andrew Hayes’ regression-based approach to 
moderation (Hayes, 2013) to predict stigma from the specific diagnoses, with extrinsic religious 
orientation as a moderator. I used PROCESS model one to run this analysis. An overview of the 
moderation model I used in this analysis is provided in Figure 2. Race, gender, familiarity with 
mental illness, and authoritarianism were included as covariates in each model. I evaluated 
model fit by assessing the statistical significance (interpreting significance at p < 0.05) and 
amount of variance accounted for in the model which is assessed by an F-test. I assessed for 
moderation by examining the statistical significance of the interaction between extrinsic religious 
orientation and specific diagnosis; a bias-corrected 95% bootstrap confidence interval using 
10,000 bootstrap samples was used to assess for the statistical significance of the effect. 
Moderation was supported if the interaction effect was statistically different from zero, as 
indicated by a 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval that is above zero. If moderation 
was present, I examined the conditional effects of diagnosis at different values of the moderator, 
extrinsic religious orientation (i.e., one standard deviation above and below the mean). To 
examine the relationship between specific diagnoses and particular dimensions of stigma as 
impacted by religious orientation, I conducted separate models in PROCESS using moderation 
(model 1) to predict each subscale (from the Attribution Questionnaire) as well as desired social 
distance (from the Social Distance Scale) from the specific diagnoses.  
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Exploratory aims 
 To examine the relationship between intrinsic religious orientation, extrinsic religious 
orientation, and mental illness stigma, I ran model three in PROCESS using moderated 
moderation to predict stigma from the specific diagnoses, using both intrinsic religious 
orientation and extrinsic religious orientation as moderators. An overview of the moderation 
model I used in this analysis is provided in Figure 3.  I evaluated model fit by assessing the 
amount of variance accounted for in the model, and I assessed for moderated moderation by 
examining the statistical significance of the interaction between extrinsic religious orientation, 
intrinsic religious orientation, and specific diagnosis ( = 0.05). If significant, I examined the 
conditional effects of diagnosis at different values of the moderators, extrinsic religious 
orientation and intrinsic religious orientation (e.g., one standard deviation above and below the 
mean).  
 In order to examine religious affiliation, I originally wanted to explore the relationship 
between different religious affiliations (e.g., Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Jewish) and stigma. 
However, the current sample had only n = 28 participants who identified themselves as a 
member of a non-Christian religion. I examined demographic differences between participants 
who were affiliated with Christianity compared to participants who were affiliated other 
religions. The groups differed by race (F(1, 180) = 4.7, p = .03) such that people who identified 
with Non-Christian religious groups had more participants who identified as African American 
or Asian. However, the groups not differ on gender, ethnicity, employment, income, or education 
level. Therefore, I collapsed the religious affiliation categories into two groups: religious and 
non-religious, as assessed by participants’ self-reported affiliation with an organized religion 
(“religious”) or self-identification as atheist, agnostic, or spiritual but not religious 
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(“nonreligious”). To examine possible differences in stigma between religious and non-religious 
people, I conducted separate ANCOVAs predicting each subscale (from the Attribution 
Questionnaire) as well as desired social distance (from the Social Distance Scale) from religious 
affiliation. Race, gender, familiarity with mental illness, and authoritarianism were included as 
covariates in each model 
Power analyses 
In order to determine appropriate sample size for my analyses, I conducted power 
analyses using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). For Aim 1, based on effect 
sizes previously reported in an assessment of the Attribution Model of mental illness stigma 
(Corrigan et al., 2003), I estimated a moderate effect size of f2 = 0.25.  Given 9 latent factors in 
the SEM model, with three indicators for each factor, minimal missing data, and significance 
level  = 0.05, I estimated that a minimum of 281 participants would be necessary for 80% 
power. For ANCOVA analyses in Aim 2, with significance level  = 0.05, and including 3 
groups in the model (schizophrenia, anorexia nervosa, and depression), I estimated that 159 
participants were necessary for 80% power in ANCOVA analyses. For hierarchical linear 
regression (moderation analyses) conducted in Aim 2, with a significance level  = 0.05 and 
including 3 predictor variables in the model (diagnosis, extrinsic religious orientation, intrinsic 
religious orientation), 75 participants will be necessary for 80% power. I concluded that 300 
participants would be necessary for 80% power across analyses.  
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RESULTS 
Preliminary analyses  
Among the 334 participants whose data were analyzed, 139 (42%) were female, 269 
(81%) identified as White or Caucasian, and 300 (90%) identified as non-Hispanic. Two hundred 
and twenty-five (67%) reported that their annual income was less than $50,000 per year, and 194 
(58%) had at least a bachelor’s degree. In terms of religious affiliation, 147 (44%) identified 
themselves as Agnostic, Atheist, or otherwise non-affiliated with any organized religion, 158 
(47%) were affiliated with Orthodox, Protestant, or Catholic denominations of Christianity, and 
28 (8%) were affiliated with other religions including Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. 
Among self-identified Christians, 39.7% considered themselves evangelical.  
A Pearson’s correlation matrix was computed to examine relationships between 
variables. Relationships between demographic variables indicated that female gender had a 
significant, though small, positive relationship with both intrinsic religiosity (r = .16) and 
identifying oneself as religious (r = .15). Minority race also had a significant positive relationship 
with intrinsic religiosity (r = .16), identifying oneself as religious (r = .14), and a stronger 
positive relationship with extrinsic religiosity (r = .33). See Table 2 for summary statistics of key 
variables and Table 3 for the full correlation matrix.  
Aim 1  
Measurement model 
 The measurement model describes the nature of the relationship between the latent 
variables and the manifest indicator variables that compose the latent factors. The model from 
our data was comprised of 9 latent constructs: blame, dangerousness, fear, pity, anger, help, 
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coercion, segregation, and avoidance. Indicator variables for the latent constructs are displayed 
in Figure 1. Initial analysis of the model revealed moderate model fit (CFI = 0.92, RMSEA = 
0.080, SRMR = 0.063) but indicated that the latent variable covariance matrix was not positive 
definite due to negative residual variance in the indicator variables for the latent variable fear. 
Given that the correlation between the fear and dangerousness subscales was very high (r = .92), 
I concluded that the indicator variables for the fear and dangerousness subscales were measuring 
a single latent variable. I respecified the measurement and structural models with a combined 
danger/fear variable, which demonstrated slightly better fit on the RMSEA index and whose 
correlation matrix was positive definite (CFI = 0.92, RMSEA = 0.079, SRMR = 0.063). This 
iteration of the measurement model indicated via modification indices (Modification Index = 
90.6, StdXY EPC = 1.3) that AQ6 (“I think Kim poses a risk to her neighbors unless she is 
hospitalized”) which had originally been used to indicate segregation, better estimated the 
resepecified latent variable danger/fear. Therefore, AQ6 was moved to indicate danger/fear and 
segregation was specified using only AQ15 and AQ17. Scores from both of the newly calculated 
subscales demonstrated excellent internal consistency (danger/fear  = .97, segregation  = .92). 
See Table 4 for standardized and unstandardized factor loadings from the final measurement 
model, which demonstrated moderate model fit (CFI = 0.93, RMSEA = 0.073, SRMR = 0.062). 
See Figure 4 for the final measurement model. 
Structural model 
 A path analysis of the theoretical model was completed next. I tested the hypothesized 
structural model (which hypothesized only indirect paths between stereotypes through prejudices 
to discriminatory or helping behaviors; see Figure 1) with the final measurement model, 
revealing poor model fit (CFI = 0.89, RMSEA = 0.086, SRMR = 0.083).  
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MPlus modification indices suggested that adding direct paths from stereotypes (blame and 
danger/fear) to discriminatory or helping behaviors (help, coercion, segregation, and avoidance) 
would improve model fit. Given that it is unlikely that prejudices (pity, anger) completely 
mediate the relationship between stereotypes (blame and danger/fear) and discrimination (help, 
coercion, segregation, and avoidance), I added direct paths (as shown in blue in Figure 5). Still, 
the final revised model displayed moderate model fit (CFI = 0.94, RMSEA = 0.070, SRMR = 
0.061).  
 Figure 5 provides standardized and unstandardized paths coefficients for paths between 
all of the variables (i.e., direct paths between stereotypes and discriminatory or helping behaviors 
as well as mediational paths from stereotypes through prejudice to discriminatory or helping 
behaviors).  The unstandardized path from pity to avoidance (r = -.40) was significant and strong, 
but was not in the hypothesized direction. The unstandardized paths from blame to anger (r = 
.43) danger/fear to anger (r = .48) and pity to help (r = .75) were significant and strong in the 
hypothesized direction.  All of the direct paths between stereotypes and discriminatory or helping 
behaviors were significant, with particularly strong paths from danger/fear to segregation (r = 
.84), and from blame to avoidance (r = -.33); the path from blame to avoidance was not in the 
hypothesized direction.  
Aim 2 
Analysis of covariance 
Guided by the measurement model above, for the remainder of the analyses, the AQ 
subscales danger and fear were combined into one danger/fear subscale (resulting in 8 
subscales), and item AQ6 was removed from the calculation of segregation and added to the 
danger/fear subscale. ANCOVAs examined differences in stigma between the three diagnoses 
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for total stigma, the 8 AQ subscales, and for social distance. There were significant effects of 
diagnosis on stigma for total stigma (F(2, 324) = 5.4, p = .01), and for 5 of the 8 AQ subscales: 
blame (F(2, 328) = 14.3, p < .00), danger/fear (F(2, 321) = 12.5, p < .00), avoidance (F(2, 330) = 
10.9, p < .00), segregation, (F(2, 331) = 4.8, p = .01), and coercion (F(2, 330) = 9.4, p < .00). 
Contrary to my hypotheses, there were no differences in mean desired social distance scores 
across groups, or for the AQ subscales anger, pity, or help.  
As hypothesized, post-hoc comparisons revealed that participants who viewed the 
vignette about schizophrenia reported the greatest amount of overall stigma. Also as 
hypothesized, participants who viewed the vignette about schizophrenia reported the greatest 
desire for segregation, endorsement of coercive treatment, and perception of danger/fear across 
the three groups. Participants reported the greatest desire to avoid the subject with schizophrenia, 
but also wished to avoid the subject with depression more than the subject with anorexia 
nervosa; this was consistent with my hypothesis for schizophrenia, but contrary to my hypothesis 
for depression. As hypothesized, participants who viewed the vignette about anorexia nervosa 
reported the greatest blame of the three groups. However, participants did not endorse greater 
anger or coercion for people with anorexia nervosa. Results and group means for post hoc 
comparisons are displayed in Table 5. 
Moderation analyses 
 Moderation analyses were conducted to examine the possible moderating effect of 
extrinsic religious orientation on predicting stigma and social distance from mental illness 
diagnosis, with race, gender, familiarity with mental illness, and authoritarianism included as 
covariates. In the model predicting total stigma from diagnosis, extrinsic religiosity trended 
toward increasing total stigma (b = 9.8, t = 1.8, p = .07, CI: -0.8 – 20.4), and there was a 
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significant interaction between extrinsic religiosity and the effect of diagnosis on total stigma 
moving from schizophrenia to depression (b = 16.5, t = 2.2, p = .03, CI:1.8 – 31.2). Because the 
predictor variable was categorical (schizophrenia = 1, anorexia nervosa = 2, depression = 3), b 
values indicate changes in the dependent variable when the vignette changes. I examined the 
conditional effects of diagnosis at one standard deviation above and below mean extrinsic 
religiosity. At mean extrinsic religiosity and one standard deviation below the mean, 
schizophrenia was significantly more stigmatized than anorexia nervosa or depression. 
Consistent with my hypothesis for anorexia nervosa, at one standard deviation above mean 
extrinsic religiosity, stigma for anorexia nervosa and depression increased such that they were no 
longer significantly different than schizophrenia (see Figure 6) – I had not hypothesized this 
result for depression. All model results and conditional effects of extrinsic religiosity at one 
standard deviation above and below the mean are displayed in Tables 6 and 7.  
 In the model predicting anger from diagnosis, extrinsic religiosity significantly increased 
anger overall (b = 1.9, t = 2.1, p = .04, CI: 0.1 – 3.9), and there was a significant interaction 
moving from schizophrenia to anorexia nervosa, consistent with my hypothesis (b = 2.8, t = 2.1, 
p = .03, CI: 0.2 – 5.5). I examined the conditional effects of diagnosis at one standard deviation 
above and below mean extrinsic religiosity. As predicted, at mean extrinsic religiosity and one 
standard deviation below the mean, there were no significant differences in anger between the 
three diagnosis. However, at one standard deviation above the mean for extrinsic religiosity, 
anger at anorexia nervosa was significantly greater than anger at schizophrenia or depression 
(see Figure 7). 
 In the models predicting danger/fear and coercion from diagnosis, contrary to my 
predictions, extrinsic religiosity did not have significant main effects. However, there were 
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significant interactions moving from schizophrenia to anorexia nervosa for danger/fear (b = 7.0, t 
= 2.2, p = .03, CI: 0.8 – 13.2) and from schizophrenia to depression for both subscales 
(danger/fear, b = 7.9, t = 2.6, p = .01, CI: 1.8 – 14.0, coercion, (b = 3.4, t = 2.7, p = .01, CI: 0.9 = 
5.9). I examined the conditional effects of diagnosis at one standard deviation above and below 
mean extrinsic religiosity. At mean extrinsic religiosity and one standard deviation below the 
mean, schizophrenia elicited significantly greater perceptions of danger/fear and coercion when 
compared to anorexia nervosa and depression. However, at one standard deviation above mean 
extrinsic religiosity, danger/fear and coercion significantly increased for depression such that 
they no longer different than schizophrenia (see Figure 8). Contrary to my hypothesis, 
danger/fear and coercion did not significantly increase for anorexia nervosa, which remained 
significantly different from depression and schizophrenia. 
 In the models predicting avoidance and social distance from diagnosis, extrinsic 
religiosity did not have any significant main effects, but there were significant interactions on 
both scales moving from schizophrenia to depression (avoidance, b = 2.9, t = 2.1, p = .04, CI: 0.2 
– 5.2; social distance, b = 0.4, t = 2.4, p = .02, CI: 0.1 – 0.7). I examined the conditional effects 
of diagnosis at one standard deviation above and below mean extrinsic religiosity. Contrary to 
my predictions, avoidance of and desired social distance from schizophrenia decreased as 
extrinsic religiosity increased, whereas avoidance and desired social distance from depression 
increased as extrinsic religiosity increased (see Figures 9 and 10).  
 In the models predicting blame and segregation from diagnosis, extrinsic religiosity had a 
significant main effect, increasing blame and segregation towards all diagnoses at all values of 
the moderator (blame, b = 3.7, t = 4.0, p < .00, CI: 1.9 – 5.5; segregation, b = 2.3, t = 3.5, p < .00, 
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CI: 1.0 – 3.6). This was consistent with my predictions; however, contrary to my hypotheses 
there were no significant interaction effects between diagnosis and extrinsic religiosity. 
Contrary to my predictions, there were no significant main or interaction effects in the 
models predicting pity or help from diagnosis. Across all diagnoses and at all values of extrinsic 
religiosity, scores for pity and help were generally high (mean pity = 20.3, mean help = 19.4 out 
of a total possible score of 27).  
Exploratory aims 
In order to explore whether intrinsic religious orientation moderated the effect of 
extrinsic religiosity (as a moderator) on the relationship between diagnosis and stigma, 
moderated moderation analyses were conducted to predict stigma and social distance from 
diagnosis with both extrinsic religiosity and intrinsic religiosity as moderators. Contrary to my 
hypotheses, and although the overall model predicting total stigma was significant (F(15, 291) = 
5.0, p < .00) and accounted for 20.5% of the variance in the model, there were no significant 
interactions between extrinsic religiosity, intrinsic religiosity, and diagnosis; Intrinsic religiosity 
did not have significant main or interaction effects for the majority of outcomes tested, and did 
not have any significant interactions with extrinsic religiosity. Among moderated moderation 
analyses predicting blame, anger, danger/fear, avoidance, coercion, segregation, pity, help, and 
social distance from diagnosis with both extrinsic religiosity and intrinsic religiosity as 
moderators, only the model predicting avoidance had significant interaction effects. In the model 
predicting avoidance, there was a significant interaction between diagnosis and intrinsic 
religiosity moving from schizophrenia to anorexia nervosa (b = -2.9, t = 2.1, p = .04, CI: 0.1 – 
5.7). I examined the conditional effects of diagnosis at one standard deviation above and below 
mean intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity. At high levels of intrinsic religiosity, avoidance of 
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anorexia nervosa increased whereas avoidance of schizophrenia decreased (see Figure 11). There 
was also a significant main effect of intrinsic religiosity (b = -2.0, t = -2.0, p = .04, CI: -4.0 - -
.04), indicating that higher intrinsic religiosity reduced avoidance behavior across diagnoses.  
ANCOVAs were conducted to examine any differences in stigma between religious and 
non-religious people for total stigma, the 8 AQ subscales, and for social distance. Race, gender, 
familiarity with mental illness, and authoritarianism were included as covariates. People who 
were affiliated with an organized religion reported significantly greater total stigma (F(1, 323) = 
31.7, p < .00), as well as greater blame (F(1, 327) = 24.6, p < .00), anger (F(1, 327) = 31.5, p < 
.00), danger/fear (F(1, 320) = 20.6, p < .00), segregation (F(1, 331) = 23.1, p < .00), and 
coercion (F(1, 329) = 39.7, p < .00). Religiously affiliated people also reported a greater desire 
for social distance, (F(1, 322) = 6.0, p = .02). There were no mean differences between religious 
and non-religious people on pity, help, or avoidance. Results and group means are displayed in 
Table 8. 
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DISCUSSION 
The primary purposes of this study were to examine the ability of the Attribution Model 
to explain mental illness stigma, and to hone in on the impact of two key predictors: the specific 
diagnosis of the person with a mental illness and the religious orientation of the participant. With 
some minor modification, the Attribution Model demonstrated a moderate fit with the data. Both 
diagnosis and religious orientation had significant impacts on stigma, with schizophrenia being 
the most stigmatized, and high extrinsic religiosity moderating the relationship between 
diagnosis and stigma. Below, I discuss major findings from each aim.  
Appropriateness of the Attribution Model to explain stigma 
The initial measurement model of the Attribution Model did not fit well; this was 
primarily caused by extremely high correlations between the fear and danger subscales. Model fit 
was moderate after collapsing fear and danger items into one subscale and moving one item to a 
better fitting latent factor, but the results raise questions about the true factor structure of the 
attribution questionnaire and the parsimony of the Attribution Model. One previous study 
conducted exploratory factor analysis with responses from the attribution questionnaire and 
found a six-factor structure, with four factors having acceptable psychometric properties: 
fear/dangerousness, help/interact (which includes the help and segregation scales), forcing 
treatment (the coercion subscale), and negative emotions (the anger subscale) (Brown, 2008). 
Together with my findings, this suggests that a fruitful path may be to more thoroughly explore 
the factor structure of the Attribution Questionnaire, which might lead to a revised, simpler 
version of the measure.  
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Coefficients in the structural model supported many of the hypotheses in the Attribution 
Model, and are largely consistent with much of the previous research (Corrigan et al., 2003; 
Corrigan, 2002). Higher perceptions of danger/fear were associated with increased anger and 
decreased pity, and also to increased support of coercive treatment, desire for social segregation 
from people with mental illnesses, increased avoidance behavior, and a decreased desire to help 
people with mental illnesses. This converges with Corrigan’s (2002) findings that increased 
perceptions of dangerousness were related to increased avoidance and endorsement of coercive 
treatment, although Corrigan’s study tested an earlier version of the Attribution Model using a 
slightly different version of the Attribution Questionnaire.  
Attributing blame to the person with a mental illness was directly associated with greater 
anger towards the person with a mental illness, and with decreased pity. This is inconsistent with 
research testing the earliest versions of the Attribution Model and Attribution Questionnaire, 
which found that “personal responsibility” (a construct related but not equivalent to blame, 
which included controllability and responsibility) was not related to anger and pity (Corrigan, 
2002). The current version of the blame subscale used in our study represents three converging 
constructs: responsibility, controllability, and the notion that the vignette subject is at fault for 
their condition. It is possible that the addition of being “at fault” for one’s illness increased the 
relevance of this construct, strengthening the relationships with pity and anger; this interpretation 
is supported by a second test of the attribution model in which blame was measured using the 
same constructs that I did, and found similar results to mine; that blame was positively associated 
with avoidance and endorsement of coercive treatment (Corrigan et al., 2003).  My study 
replicated these results, and also found that increased blame was directly associated with 
increased desire for social segregation.  
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Contrary to my hypotheses and to Corrigan and colleague’s (2003) findings, higher 
blame was associated with a small but significant increase in the desire to help people with 
mental illnesses. In addition, the relationship between anger and help was not significant; in two 
previous studies, Corrigan and colleagues (2002, 2003) found that anger was associated with less 
of a desire to help. It may be possible that the intervening years of effort to reduce public stigma 
against mental illness have effectively changed the relationship between anger, blame, and 
helping behavior. Members of the public may be able to blame people for having mental 
illnesses and subsequently be angry at them, but simultaneously want to help (or at the very least, 
recognize that they should want to help) people with mental illnesses. This idea is supported by 
the generally high scores on help among participants in the study (mean help = 19.4), and by the 
increasing prevalence of public influence campaigns designed to make people more familiar with 
and more educated about mental illnesses (Corrigan et al., 2012; Corrigan & Shapiro, 2010).  
Diagnosis as a predictor of stigma 
I examined the relationship between three different diagnoses (schizophrenia, anorexia 
nervosa, and depression) and different aspects of mental illness stigma. Total stigma was highest 
among participants who read the vignette about a person with schizophrenia; this is consistent 
both with my hypotheses and with previous research suggesting that the general public exhibits 
greater stigma towards severe mental illness (Corrigan et al., 2003; Corrigan et al., 2001; Crisp et 
al., 2000; Loch et al., 2014; Mestdagh & Hansen, 2013; Stewart, Keel, & Schiavo, 2006). The 
analyses with the stigma subscales highlight potential explanations for the greater stigma 
attached to schizophrenia, relative to anorexia nervosa or depression; schizophrenia was 
perceived as more dangerous/elicited greater fear, and participants who read the vignette about 
schizophrenia wanted to be socially segregated from people with schizophrenia and were more 
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likely to endorse coercive treatment. Based on my conclusions from the path analysis of the 
attribution model, it is possible that participants’ desire for social segregation and support for 
coercive treatment stems directly from the assessment that people with schizophrenia might be 
dangerous.  
Participants endorsed the greatest desire to avoid contact with people with schizophrenia. 
However, contrary to my original hypotheses, participants who read the vignette about 
depression also endorsed significantly greater avoidance than participants who read the vignette 
about anorexia nervosa. I had reasoned that participants would be most familiar with depression 
and therefore would feel more comfortable around people with depression. However, it is 
possible that the result for depression is explained by assumptions about controllability and 
severity; existing research suggests that the general public views anorexia nervosa as less severe 
and more controllable than other mental illnesses (Crisafulli et al., 2010; Stewart et al., 2006, 
2008), which may lead to greater comfort being around people with anorexia nervosa than 
people with depression.   
 Consistent with my hypotheses, participants who read the vignette about a person with 
anorexia nervosa blamed her more for her illness than did participants who read about 
schizophrenia or depression; this was the only subscale in which anorexia nervosa was most 
stigmatized relative to the other illnesses. The specific questions that make up the blame subscale 
in the attribution questionnaire address responsibility, controllability, and the question of 
whether or not “Kim” is at fault for her own condition. Therefore, these results are consistent 
with prior research on stereotypes associated with anorexia nervosa, suggesting that the general 
public broadly believes that eating disorders are controllable and that people with anorexia 
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nervosa could pull themselves together if they wanted to (Crisafulli et al., 2010; Stewart, 
Schiavo, Herzog, & Franko, 2008; Stewart et al., 2006). 
 There were no differences across diagnoses in the pity, help, or anger subscales of the 
attribution questionnaire. Feelings of pity for the person in the vignette and desire to help the 
person in the vignette were both generally high (mean pity = 20.3, mean help = 19.4), suggesting 
that participants may have a baseline level of empathy towards all three illnesses in question, 
although the pity subscale includes multiple constructs – concern, sympathy, and pity.  
Future research and implications for diagnosis 
 My results, as well as existing research, make it clear that the public stigma attached to 
specific diagnoses differs significantly. Future research should endeavor to contextualize the 
results found in this analysis with regards to the diagnoses in question, which could also add to 
our understanding of the attributions at the core of mental illness stigma. Specifically, future 
research might further examine the assumptions and emotional reactions at the core of avoiding 
people with depression as opposed to avoiding people with anorexia nervosa. My results also 
have important practical implications for anti-stigma campaigns; when confronting stigma, 
advocates must consider all of the potential stereotypes attached to mental illness. In situations 
where a specific type of diagnosis is most common (e.g., on certain sports teams where eating 
disorders are common, or in homelessness advocacy settings where schizophrenia might be more 
common), it may be necessary to tailor anti-stigma work to target the specific stereotypes that a 
given diagnosis is most likely to activate.  
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Extrinsic religiosity as a predictor of stigma 
 Religiosity was another predictor of interest in this study. Broadly speaking, and 
consistent with my hypotheses, higher levels of extrinsic religiosity were associated with 
increased mental illness stigma – that is, extrinsic religiosity had a main effect, associated with 
increased blame, desire for segregation, anger, and total stigma. Extrinsic religiosity was also a 
moderator of the relationship between diagnosis and stigma. For overall stigma and perceptions 
of danger/fear, high levels of extrinsic religiosity negated the differential impact of diagnosis. At 
mean or lower levels of extrinsic religiosity, schizophrenia was perceived as significantly more 
dangerous than anorexia nervosa or depression. However, as extrinsic religiosity increased, 
perceptions of danger/fear increased for both anorexia nervosa and depression, such that at high 
levels of extrinsic religiosity, all diagnoses were perceived as equally dangerous. For anger, 
moderation was a little different. At high levels of extrinsic religiosity, anger increased for 
depression and anorexia nervosa, but not for schizophrenia. This might be because both 
depression and anorexia nervosa (but particularly anorexia) are perceived as more controllable 
than schizophrenia, as was demonstrated in the ANCOVA analyses. This effect of increased 
anger at depression and anorexia nervosa is also consistent with my path analysis results, 
indicating that increased blame is associated with increased anger. For avoidance, moderation 
analyses were puzzling. Inconsistent with my initial hypotheses, this analysis suggested that 
avoidance of depression increased with extrinsic religiosity, and that avoidance of anorexia 
nervosa did not change as extrinsic religiosity increased. However, for schizophrenia, avoidance 
decreased as extrinsic religiosity increased. At both mean and high levels of extrinsic religiosity, 
the mean avoidance for schizophrenia and depression were not significantly different from each 
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other. It is not clear why this diagnostic group might engender different patterns of avoidance at 
different levels of extrinsic religiosity. 
 Aside from avoidance, the remainder of the analyses suggested a fairly consistent 
pattern—that extrinsic religiosity was associated with increased mental illness stigma. We 
suggest two key factors that may explain these findings. First, extrinsic religiosity indicates 
participation in religious services motivated by the desire to find community and social support 
(Donahue, 1985), and many religious communities are historically conservative, with strict social 
norms (Iannaccone, 1994). Indeed, research has shown extrinsic religiosity to be associated with 
increased social conformity (Rodriguez & Henderson, 2010).  It is possible that people with 
mental illnesses violate social norms, which may be particularly troubling for people with high 
extrinsic religiosity, motivating them to endorse greater stigma.  
Second, it is also possible that specific religious beliefs about the causes and 
controllability of mental illness contribute to increased stigma. In particular, Christian religious 
beliefs about the causes of mental illness focus on sin and morality (e.g., “moral weakness is the 
main cause of mental illness”) and participants from Christian backgrounds may minimize 
psychosocial or biological causes of mental illness, thus perceiving mental illnesses as generally 
more controllable and people with mental illnesses as more to blame for their conditions 
(Wesselmann & Graziano, 2010). This explanation would be consistent with the moderation 
effects for anorexia nervosa found in this aim – given that anorexia nervosa is generally 
perceived as more controllable than other mental illnesses, people who believe that mental 
illnesses in general are due to personal error (and that this constitutes a significant moral failing) 
might endorse increased stigma for anorexia nervosa.  
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Exploratory aims for religiosity 
Given previous research indicating that intrinsic religiosity correlates with positive 
coping behaviors (Hackney & Sanders, 2003), I explored the possibility that intrinsic religiosity 
might have some protective effects with regard to stigma, specifically that it would moderate the 
effects of extrinsic religiosity (that is, moderating the moderator). However, the relationship 
between intrinsic religiosity and stigma was largely nonexistent for the all outcomes except 
avoidance. Higher intrinsic religiosity was associated with reduced avoidance behavior across 
diagnoses, and at high levels of intrinsic religiosity, avoidance of anorexia nervosa increased 
whereas avoidance of schizophrenia decreased (see Figure 11). The lack of significant 
relationships between intrinsic religiosity and different aspects of stigma suggests that it is not 
simply religious affiliation and faith that predict greater stigma. Rather, extrinsic motivation to 
be involved in religious communities predicts mental illness stigma.   
 I also explored whether or not affiliation with any organized religion impacted stigma, 
although participants were primarily from Christian denominations. Results indicated that 
religiously affiliated people endorsed greater stigma on all subscales except for pity, help, and 
avoidance. These results are largely consistent with my findings on extrinsic religiosity and 
stigma. This correspondence makes sense, given that only religiously affiliated people would 
endorse high extrinsic religiosity.  
Future research and implications for religiosity 
It would be useful to further investigate the precise underpinnings of the association 
between extrinsic religiosity and mental illness stigma, with both qualitative and quantitative 
research. First, because researchers disagree on which aspects of religious life are most important 
to measure in relation to prejudice, it will be important to assess this relationship using additional 
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measures of religiosity, e.g., the index of spiritual experiences (Kass, Friedman, Leserman, 
Zuttermeister, & Benson, 1991) or a measure of the centrality of religion (Huber & Huber, 
2012). Such measures might target other facets of religious life and help researchers to tease out 
the precise aspects of religion that most directly impact mental illness stigma. We can also work 
to understand the nuanced ways in which religion impacts stigma through qualitative research 
with members of various religions about their beliefs about mental illnesses and how those 
beliefs connect to faith and religious life. Although qualitative research has limited 
generalizability, it may be particularly helpful in exploratory contexts. In our study, small sample 
sizes precluded examinations of different religions; in contrast, in-depth interviews with faith 
leaders and people of faith can provide richness and context (Maxwell, 2004; Watkins, 2012). 
Because prior research examining religiosity and stigma (and much of the research on religiosity 
in general) focuses primarily on Christian religious belief, it will also be necessary to conduct 
targeted research with non-Christian religious groups in an effort to understand how diverse faith 
backgrounds and belief systems affect beliefs about mental illness. This research will likely 
require targeted recruitment and partnership with diverse faith communities. 
The impact of extrinsic religiosity on mental illness stigma has clear practical 
implications. Specifically, it may be beneficial to develop anti-stigma programming that is 
targeted to faith communities. Reviews of the literature have found positive and negative 
associations between religious belief and mental health; in some cases, religion serves as a 
source of comfort and hope, while in others, religious belief can lead to spiritual struggles that 
inhibit recovery from mental illness (Ellison, Fang, Flannelly, & Steckler, 2013; Koenig, 2009; 
Seybold & Hill, 2001). Anti-stigma work could be built around connections between faith 
leaders and mental health professionals, who can partner with and educate each other on the 
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needs and values of particular faith communities and the local resources available to treat mental 
illness. Since churches, temples, and mosques serve as the center of community life for many 
people, this work could simultaneously decrease stigma and facilitate help-seeking within houses 
of worship.   
Study limitations 
 This research was conducted with a sample of participants from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (Mturk), which may have resulted in a restricted sample. Although participants recruited 
through Mturk are shown to be significantly more representative of the US population than 
samples recruited within university student populations (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011), 
existing work suggests that our results may not generalize; Mturk workers are less religious than 
the general US population (Lewis, Djupe, Mockabee, & Wu, 2015). Current data indicates that 
70% of the US population identifies as Christian, that 6% are affiliated with religions other than 
Christianity, and that 23% are unaffiliated with any organized religion (NW, Washington, & 
Inquiries, n.d.). Therefore, it is probable that our sample exhibited lower mean extrinsic and 
intrinsic religiosity than we would find in the general population; this may have affected the 
relationships we found in this study.    
 Finally, this study’s conclusions are also limited by the measures available for assessing 
religious orientation. Researchers have critiqued the Age Universal I-E scale-12 for its 
development within primarily Christian or nonreligious populations, and question the validity of 
using this measure with non-Christian religious groups (Tiliopoulos, Bikker, Coxon, & Hawkin, 
2007). This was not likely a substantial problem for our sample, given that few participants were 
members of non-Christian religions.  
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Conclusion 
Overall, my results support the idea that attributions about the dangerousness and 
controllability of a mental illness contribute to mental illness stigma. Specific diagnoses activate 
differing stereotypes about mental illnesses, and extrinsic religiosity appears to change 
attributions about dangerousness and controllability for some illnesses more than others, 
although extrinsic religiosity may increase stigma overall. Further research is necessary to refine 
the Attribution Model and better distinguish between stereotypes, prejudice, and discriminatory 
or helping behaviors towards people with mental illnesses. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Aims and hypotheses for the current study 
Aim 1: Testing the Attribution Model  
Factor Hypotheses 
Blame Higher blame will lead to decreases in pity, and increases in anger and fear 
Dangerousness Higher dangerousness will lead to decreases in pity, and increases in anger and fear 
Pity Higher pity will lead to increases in help, and decreases in coercion, segregation, and avoidance 
Anger Higher anger will lead to decreases in help, and increases in coercion, segregation, and 
avoidance 
Fear Higher fear will lead to decreases in help, and increases in coercion, segregation, and avoidance 
Aim 2: Predictors of mental illness stigma 
Aim 2A: The impact of diagnosis 
Diagnosis Hypothesized highest dimensions of stigma 
Schizophrenia1 Fear – level of fear of the person with mental illness 
Avoidance – avoidance of the person with mental illness 
Segregation – desire to be socially segregated from the person with mental illness 
Dangerousness – perceptions that the person with mental illness is dangerous 
Anorexia 
Nervosa 
Coercion2 – agreement that forced mental health treatment would be appropriate for the person 
with mental illness 
Blame – blaming the person with mental illness for their illness 
Anger – anger toward the person with mental illness 
Depression Pity – feelings of pity for the person with mental illness 
Help – desire to help the person with mental illness 
Aim 2B: The impact of religious orientation  
Factor Hypotheses 
Total Stigma Higher extrinsic religiosity will have a main effect, increasing stigma across all diagnoses3.  
Higher extrinsic religiosity will also interact with diagnosis, increasing stigma for anorexia. 
These hypotheses were examined for the stigma subscales as well. 
Aim 3: Exploratory aims  
Factor Hypotheses 
Intrinsic 
Religiosity 
High intrinsic religiosity will moderate the effect of high extrinsic religiosity, such that high 
extrinsic religiosity will no longer lead to greater stigma. 
Religious 
affiliation 
Participants who are affiliated with any organized religion will endorse greater stigma as 
compared to participants who are not affiliated with an organized religion. 
Note: dimensions of stigma come from the subscales measured in the Attribution Questionnaire 
(AQ-27) (Corrigan et al., 2003). 
1Schizophrenia is hypothesized to be associated with higher levels of total stigma (a sum of the 
subscales of stigma measured in the AQ_27) relative to anorexia nervosa and depression. 
2Coercion is hypothesized to be highest for both anorexia nervosa and schizophrenia relative to 
depression. 
3I predict main effects of extrinsic religiosity increasing stigma across diagnosis for all stigma 
subscales.  
62 
 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics for key variables 
 
 N %   
Female gender1 139 41.6%   
Minority race2 65 19.5%   
Hispanic ethnicity3 33 9.9%   
Religious4 182 54.7   
 M SD Min Max  
Age 35.8 10.3 19 72 
Intrinsic religiosity5 1.8 0.8 1 3 
Extrinsic religiosity5 1.6 0.6 1 3 
Authoritarianism6 4.9 2.2 1 9 
Blame7 10.9 6.0 3 27 
Anger 8.4 6.1 3 27 
Pity 20.4 5.2 3 27 
Help 19.4 5.6 3 27 
Danger/fear 19.7 14.8 7 63 
Avoidance 12.5 5.9 3 27 
Segregation 5.5 4.4 2 18 
Coercion 13.2 5.8 3 27 
Total stigma 101.1 34.4 36 198 
Social distance8 2.3 0.7 1 4 
Familiarity with mental 
illness9 
6.7 2.9 1 11 
1 Male is coded as 0, Female is coded as 1 
2 White/Caucasian is coded as 0, minority is coded as 1  
3 Non-Hispanic is coded as 0, Hispanic is coded as 1 
4 Non-religious is coded as 0, religious is coded as 1  
5 Age Universal I-E Scale-12: 1 – 3, higher scores indicate higher religiosity  
6 Very Short Authoritarianism Scale: 1 – 9, higher scores indicate higher authoritarianism 
7 Attribution Questionnaire: 1 – 9, higher scores indicate greater endorsement of the trait  
8 Social Distance Scale: 1 – 4, higher scores indicate greater desire for social distance 
9 Level of Familiarity Scale: 1 – 11, higher scores indicate greater familiarity 
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Table 4. Standardized and unstandardized factor loadings in the measurement model 
 
 Unstandardized factor loading 
(standard error) 
Standardized factor loading 
Blame   
AQ 10 1.00 (.00) .93 (.02) 
AQ 11 .61 (.06) .58 (.04) 
AQ 23 .82 (.06) .74 (.03) 
Anger   
AQ 1 1.00 (.00) .87 (.02) 
AQ 4 .99 (.04) .89 (.01) 
AQ 12 .99 (.04) .92 (.01) 
Pity   
AQ 9 1.00 (.00) .64 (.04) 
AQ 22 1.36 (.12) .92 (.03) 
AQ 27 .93 (.09) .69 (.04) 
Help   
AQ 8 1.00 (.00) .75 (.03) 
AQ 20 1.12 (.09) .77 (.03) 
AQ 21 1.16 (.09) .82 (.03) 
Danger/Fear   
AQ 2 1.00 (.00) .91 (.01) 
AQ 13 .93 (.03) .91 (.01) 
AQ 18 .96 (.03) .94 (.01) 
AQ 3 .95 (.04) .88 (.01) 
AQ 19 .96 (.03) .93 (.01) 
AQ 24 .93 (.04) .87 (.01) 
AQ 6 .94 (.04) .89 (.01) 
Avoidance   
AQ 7 1.00 (.00) .69 (.04) 
AQ 16 1.09 (.11) .75 (.04) 
AQ 26 1.00 (.09) .73 (.04) 
Segregation   
AQ 15 1.00 (.00) .92 (.01) 
AQ 17 .95 (.04) .91 (.01) 
Coercion   
AQ 5 1.00 (.00) .25 (.05) 
AQ 14 2.14 (.44) .53 (.04) 
AQ 25 3.11 (.71) .89 (.03) 
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Table 5. Differences in stigma by diagnosis 
 
 Schizophrenia  
(N = 114) 
Anorexia 
nervosa  
(N = 110) 
Depression  
(N = 110) 
    
 M SD M SD M SD f df p Partial 
2 
           
Blame1 9.1 0.5 13.2** 0.6 10.6 0.6 14.3 2, 328 .00 .08 
Anger1 8.1 0.6 8.7 0.6 8.5 0.6 0.3 2, 328 .72 .00 
Pity1 20.7 0.5 20.6 0.5 19.7 0.5 1.2 2, 329 .29 .01 
Help1 18.8 0.5 20.2 0.5 19.3 0.5 1.8 2, 331 .16 .01 
Danger/Fear
2 25.0** 1.3 16.0 1.4 17.9 1.4 12.5 2, 321 .00 .07 
Avoidance1 13.9** 0.5 10.5 0.5 12.9** 0.5 10.9 2, 330 .00 .06 
Segregation
3 6.5** 0.4 4.8 0.4 5.3 0.4 4.8 2, 331 .01 .03 
Coercion1 15.1** 0.5 12.0 0.6 12.6 0.5 9.4 2, 330 .00 .06 
Total4 109.5*
* 
3.2 95.4 3.3 97.9 3.3 5.4 2, 313 .01 .03 
           
Social 
Distance5 
2.4 0.1 2.3 0.1 2.3 0.1 0.8 2, 328 .49 .00 
Note: Covariates included in the models were race, gender, familiarity with mental illness, and 
authoritarianism. 
1 Attribution Questionnaire subscale: sum of 3 items scored 1-9, higher scores indicate greater 
endorsement of the trait  
2 Attribution Questionnaire subscale: sum of 7 items, ranging from 7 to 63 
3 Attribution Questionnaire subscale: sum of 2 items, ranging from 2 to 18 
4 Sum score of all 27 items from the Attribution Questionnaire, ranging from 27 to 243 
5 Social Distance Scale: 1 – 4, higher scores indicate greater desire for social distance 
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Table 6. Mental Illness stigma predicted from diagnosis and extrinsic religiosity  
Diagnosis 
 
Schizophrenia → 
Anorexia X Extrinsic 
religiosity 
Schizophrenia → 
Depression X 
Extrinsic religiosity 
 
Schizophrenia → 
Anorexia 
Schizophrenia → 
Depression 
Extrinsic 
religiosity 
Blame1 
     
b 4.4 1.7 3.7 -1.2 0.4 
t 5.9 2.3 4.0 -0.9 0.3 
P .00 .02 .00 .35 .75 
Anger1      
b 0.9 0.5 1.9 2.8 2.3 
t 1.2 0.7 2.1 2.1 1.7 
P .22 .49 .04 .03 .08 
Pity1      
b -0.3 -1.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.9 
t -0.4 -1.8 0.3 -0.1 -0.8 
P .68 .09 .79 .95 .41 
Help1      
b 1.3 0.4 0.3 -0.9 -0.2 
t 1.8 0.6 0.3 -0.7 -0.2 
P .08 .56 .76 .46 .86 
Danger/fear2      
b -8.6 -6.9 2.8 7.0 7.9 
t -4.7 -3.8 1.3 2.2 2.6 
P .00 .00 .20 .03 .01 
Avoidance1      
b -3.5 -1.1 -1.4 1.7 2.7 
t -4.7 -1.5 -1.5 1.3 2.1 
P .00 .13 .12 .19 .04 
Segregation3      
b -1.6 -1.1 2.3 0.6 -0.1 
t -2.9 -2.1 3.5 0.7 -3.4 
P .00 .04 .00 .49 .00 
Coercion1      
b -3.1 -2.6 1.1 1.7 3.4 
t -4.1 -3.5 1.2 1.3 2.7 
P .00 .00 .23 .19 .01 
Total stigma4      
b -13.1 -11.2 9.8 12.1 16.5 
t -2.9 -2.6 1.8 1.6 2.2 
P .00 .01 .07 .11 .03 
Social 
distance5 
     
b -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.4 
t -0.9 -1.2 -0.5 0.8 2.4 
P .32 .23 .60 .42 .02 
Note: the independent variable (diagnosis) has been mean-centered. Covariates included in the models were race, 
gender, familiarity with mental illness, and authoritarianism. 
1Attribution Questionnaire subscale: sum of 3 items scored 1-9, higher scores indicate greater endorsement 
2 Attribution Questionnaire subscale: sum of 7 items; 3 Attribution Questionnaire subscale: sum of 2 items 
4 Sum score of all 27 items from the Attribution Questionnaire 
5 Social Distance Scale: 1 – 4, higher scores indicate greater desire for social distance  
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Table 7. Conditional effects of extrinsic religiosity on mental illness stigma  
Schizophrenia → Anorexia nervosa Schizophrenia → Depression  
b t P b t P 
Blame1 
      
1 SD below 5.1 4.9 .00 1.4 1.4 .18 
Mean 4.4 5.9 .00 1.6 2.3 .02 
1 SD above 3.7 3.5 .00 1.9 1.8 .07 
Anger1       
1 SD below -0.7 -0.6 .52 -0.8 -0.7 .47 
Mean 0.9 1.2 .21 0.5 0.7 .49 
1 SD above 2.6 1.4 .02 1.9 1.7 .08 
Pity1       
1 SD below -0.2 -0.2 .81 -0.6 -0.6 .56 
Mean -0.3 -0.4 .68 -1.1 -1.7 .09 
1 SD above -0.3 -0.3 .74 -1.7 -1.8 .07 
Help1       
1 SD below 1.8 1.8 .08 0.6 0.5 .59 
Mean 1.3 1.8 .08 0.4 0.6 .57 
1 SD above 0.8 0.7 .47 0.3 0.3 .76 
Danger/fear2       
1 SD below -12.7 -4.9 .00 -11.5 -4.4 .00 
Mean -8.6 -4.7 .00 -6.9 -3.8 .00 
1 SD above -4.5 -1.8 .08 2.3 -0.9 .36 
Avoidance1       
1 SD below -4.5 -4.2 .00 -2.7 -2.5 .01 
Mean -3.5 -4.7 .00 -1.1 -1.5 .13 
1 SD above -2.5 -2.4 .02 .44 .42 .68 
Segregation3       
1 SD below -1.9 -2.6 .01 -1.1 -1.4 .17 
Mean -1.6 -2.9 .00 -1.1 -2.1 .04 
1 SD above -1.2 -1.6 .11 -1.2 -1.6 .11 
Coercion1       
1 SD below -4.0 -3.9 .00 -4.6 -4.4 .00 
Mean -3.1 -4.1 .00 -2.6 -3.5 .00 
1 SD above -2.1 -1.9 .05 -0.6 -0.6 .55 
Total stigma4       
1 SD below -20.1 -3.2 .00 -20.7 -3.3 .00 
Mean -13.1 -2.9 .00 -11.2 -2.6 .01 
1 SD above -6.1 -0.9 .33 -1.6 -0.3 .79 
Social distance5       
1 SD below -0.2 -1.3 .20 -0.3 -2.5 .01 
Mean -0.1 -0.9 .32 -0.1 -1.2 .22 
1 SD above -0.0 -0.1 .89 0.1 0.9 .39 
Note: the independent variable (diagnosis) has been mean-centered. Covariates included in the models were race, 
gender, familiarity with mental illness, and authoritarianism. 
1Attribution Questionnaire subscale: sum of 3 items scored 1-9, higher scores indicate greater endorsement 
2 Attribution Questionnaire subscale: sum of 7 items;3 Attribution Questionnaire subscale: sum of 2 items  
4 Sum score of all 27 items from the Attribution Questionnaire 
5 Social Distance Scale: 1 – 4, higher scores indicate greater desire for social distance  
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Table 8. Differences between religious and non-religious participants 
 
Note: Covariates included in the model were race, gender, familiarity with mental illness, and 
authoritarianism 
1 Attribution Questionnaire subscale: sum of 3 items scored 1-9, higher scores indicate greater 
endorsement of the trait  
2 Attribution Questionnaire subscale: sum of 7 items scored 1-9  
3 Attribution Questionnaire subscale: sum of 2 items scored 1-9 
4 Sum score of all 27 items from the Attribution Questionnaire 
5 Social Distance Scale: 1 – 4, higher scores indicate greater desire for social distance 
6 Age Universal I-E Scale-12: 1 – 3, higher scores indicate higher religiosity  
7 Age Universal I-E Scale-12: 1 – 3, higher scores indicate higher religiosity 
  
 
Religious  
(N = 182) 
Non-
Religious  
(N = 151) 
 
 
 
 
 
M SD M SD f 
df 
p 
Partial 
2 
       
Blame1 12.4** 0.4 9.1 0.5 24.6 1, 327 0.00 .07 
Anger1 10.1** 0.4 6.4 0.5 31.5 1, 327 0.00 .09 
Pity1 20.5 0.4 20.2 0.4 0.4 1, 328 0.54 .00 
Help1 19.4 0.4 19.4 0.6 0.0 1, 330 0.97 .00 
Danger/Fear2 23.1** 1.1 15.8 1.2 20.6 1, 320 0.00 .06 
Avoidance1 12.7 0.4 12.2 0.5 0.6 1, 329 0.43 .00 
Segregation3 6.5** 0.3 4.3 0.3 23.1 1, 331 0.00 .07 
Coercion1 15.0** 0.4 11.1 0.6 39.7 1, 329 0.00 .11 
Total4 110.8*
* 
2.5 89.9 2.7 31.7 1, 312 0.00 .09 
         
Social distance5 2.4 0.1 2.2 0.1 6.0 1, 322 0.02 .02 
         
Intrinsic 
religiosity6 
2.3 0.0 1.2 0.0 243.9 1, 322 0.00 .43 
Extrinsic 
religiosity 
1.9 0.0 1.2 0.0 170.4 1, 321 0.00 .35 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Hypothesized relationships in the Attribution Model 
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Figure 2. PROCESS model of moderation 
 
 
 
Figure 3. PROCESS model of moderated moderation 
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Figure 4. Final measurement model 
 
Note: See Table 3 for final factor loadings. AQ stands for Attribution Questionnaire, the scale I 
have used to measure different aspects of stigma. 
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Figure 6. Total stigma at values of extrinsic religiosity 
 
Note: Possible values for total stigma range from 27 – 243. 
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Figure 7. Anger at values of extrinsic religiosity 
 
Note: Possible values for anger range from 3 – 27. 
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Figure 8. Danger/fear at values of extrinsic religiosity 
 
Note: Possible values for danger/fear range from 7 – 63. 
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Figure 9. Avoidance at values of extrinsic religiosity 
 
Note: Possible values range from 3 – 27. 
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Figure 10. Social distance at values of extrinsic religiosity 
 
Note: Possible values for social distance range from 1 – 4. 
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Figure 11. Avoidance at values of extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity 
Note: Possible values for avoidance range from 3 – 27. 
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APPENDIX 
Attribution Questionnaire-27 
 
Please read the following statement about Kim (participants will be randomized to 1 of 3 
vignettes):  
Schizophrenia.  
Kim is a 30-year-old single woman with schizophrenia. Sometimes she hears voices and 
becomes upset. She lives alone in an apartment and works as a clerk at a large law firm. 
She has been hospitalized six times because of schizophrenia. 
 
Anorexia Nervosa. 
Kim is a 30-year-old single woman with anorexia nervosa. Sometimes she has difficulty 
maintaining a healthy body weight and does not eat all day. She lives alone in an apartment and 
works as a clerk at a large law firm. She has been hospitalized six times because of anorexia 
nervosa. 
 
Depression. 
Kim is a 30-year-old single woman with major depression. Sometimes she has difficulty getting 
out of bed in the morning and sleeps all day. She lives alone in an apartment and works as a clerk 
at a large law firm. She has been hospitalized six times because of major depression. 
 
Now answer each of the following questions about Kim. Choose the number of the best answer 
to each question. 
 
1. I would feel aggravated by Kim. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
not at all       very much 
 
2. I would feel unsafe around Kim. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
no, not at all       yes, very much 
 
3. Kim would terrify me. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
not at all       very much 
 
4. How angry would you feel at Kim? 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
not at all       very much 
 
5. If I were in charge of Kim’s treatment, I would require her to take her medication. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
not at all       very much 
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6. I think Kim poses a risk to her neighbors unless she is hospitalized. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
none at all       very much 
 
7. If I were an employer, I would interview Kim for a job. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
not likely       very likely 
 
8. I would be willing to talk to Kim about her problems. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
not at all       very much 
 
9. I would feel pity for Kim. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
none at all       very much 
 
10. I would think that it was Kim’s own fault that she is in the present condition. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
no, not at all       yes, absolutely so 
 
11. How controllable, do you think, is the cause of Kim’s present condition? 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
not at all under personal control   completely under personal control  
   
12. How irritated would you feel by Kim? 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
not at all       very much 
 
13. How dangerous would you feel Kim is? 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
not at all       very much 
 
14. How much do you agree that Kim should be forced into treatment with her doctor even if she 
does not want to? 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
not at all       very much 
 
15. I think it would be best for Kim’s community if she were put away in a psychiatric hospital. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
not at all       very much 
 
16. I would share a car pool with Kim every day. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
not likely       very likely 
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17. How much do you think an asylum, where Kim can be kept away from her neighbors, is the 
best place for her? 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
not at all       very much 
 
18. I would feel threatened by Kim. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
no, not at all       yes, very much 
 
19. How scared of Kim would you feel? 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
not at all       very much 
 
20. How likely is it that you would help Kim? 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
definitely would not help     definitely would help 
 
21. How certain would you feel that you would help Kim? 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
not at all certain      absolutely certain 
 
22. How much sympathy would you feel for Kim? 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
none at all       very much 
 
23. How responsible, do you think, is Kim for her present condition? 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
not at all responsible     very much responsible  
      
24. How frightened of Kim would you feel? 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
not at all       very much 
 
25. If I were in charge of Kim’s treatment, I would force her to live in a group home. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
not at all       very much 
 
26. If I were a landlord, I probably would rent an apartment to Kim. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
not likely       very likely 
 
27. How much concern would you feel for Kim? 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
none at all       very much 
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The AQ-27 Score Sheet 
Name or ID Number________________________________ Date ____________ 
The AQ-27 consists of 9 stereotype factors; scores for each factor are determined by summing 
the items as outlined below: Note: items are reversed score prior to summing up for the 
Avoidance scale. 
________ Blame = AQ10+ AQ11 +AQ23 
________ Anger = AQ1 + AQ4 + AQ12 
________ Pity = AQ9 + AQ22 + AQ27 
________ Help = AQ8 + AQ20 + AQ21 (Reverse score all three questions) 
________ Dangerousness = AQ2 + AQ13 + AQ18 
________ Fear = AQ3 + AQ19 + AQ24 
________ Avoidance = AQ7 + AQ16 + AQ26 (Reverse score all three questions) 
________ Segregation = AQ6 + AQ15 + AQ17 
________ Coercion = AQ5 + AQ14 + AQ25 
The higher the score, the more that factor is being endorsed by the subject.  
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Social Distance Scale (SDS) 
 
Please answer the questions below, indicating the extent of your willingness or unwillingness to 
engage in the scenarios described, using the following scale: 
 
1 Definitely Unwilling 
2 Probably Unwilling 
3 Probably Willing 
4 Definitely Willing 
 
1. How would you feel about renting a room in your home to someone with a mental illness? 
1  2  3  4 
 
2. How would you feel about working with someone with a mental illness? 
1 2  3  4 
 
3. How would you feel about having someone with a mental illness as your neighbor? 
1  2  3  4 
 
4. How would you feel about having someone with a mental illness as the caretaker of your 
children? 
1  2  3  4 
 
5. How would you feel about having your children marry someone with a mental illness? 
1  2  3  4 
 
6. How would you feel about introducing someone with a mental illness to your friends? 
1  2  3  4 
 
7. How would you feel about recommending someone with a mental illness for a job working 
with someone you know? 
1  2  3  4 
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The Level of Contact Report   
Each item below has been coded in the level of intimacy: 11= most intimate contact with a 
person with mental illness, 7= medium intimacy, 1= little intimacy.  
The index for this contact was the rank score of the most intimate situation indicated. If a person 
checks more than one item, rank their HIGHEST level of intimacy.  
3 - I have watched a movie or television show in which a character depicted a person with mental 
illness.  
7 - My job involves providing services/treatment for persons with a severe mental illness.  
2 - I have observed, in passing, a person I believe may have had a severe mental illness.  
5 - I have observed persons with a severe mental illness on a frequent basis. 
 
11 - I have a severe mental illness.  
 
6 - I have worked with a person who had a severe mental illness at my place of employment.  
1 - I have never observed a person that I was aware had a severe mental illness.  
8 - A friend of the family has a severe mental illness.  
9 - I have a relative who has a severe mental illness.  
4 - I have watched a documentary on television about severe mental illness.  
10 - I live with a person who has a severe mental illness.  
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Age-Universal IE scale - 12  
Think about each item carefully. Does the attitude or behavior described in the statement apply 
to me?  
1 – No 
2 – Not certain 
3 – Yes 
 
1. I enjoy reading about my religion. 
 1 2 3 
 
2. I attend religious services because it helps me make friends. 
 1 2 3 
 
3. It is important to me to spend time in private thought and prayer. 
 1 2 3 
 
4. I have often had a strong sense of God’s presence. 
 1 2 3 
 
5. I pray mainly to gain relief and protection. 
1 2 3 
 
6. I try hard to live all my life according to my religious beliefs. 
 1 2 3 
 
7. What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow. 
 1 2 3 
 
8. My religion is important because it answers many questions about the meaning of life. 
 1 2 3 
 
9. Prayer is for peace and happiness. 
 1 2 3 
 
10. I attend religious services mostly to spend time with my friends.  
 1 2 3 
 
11. My whole approach to life is based on my religion. 
 1 2 3 
 
12. I attend religious services mainly because I enjoy seeing people I know there. 
 1 2 3 
 
 
Intrinsic items – 6, 4, 11, 8, 1, 3 
Extrinsic items – 2, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12  
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Religious Affiliation 
1. What is your present religion, if any?  
Protestant 
Roman Catholic 
Mormon 
Orthodox Christian 
Jewish 
Muslim 
Buddhist 
Hindu 
Other:  __________ 
Atheist 
Agnostic 
 
1a. [If participant selects Protestant or Roman Catholic…] 
Would you describe yourself as a “born-again” or evangelical Christian, or not? 
 
Yes, would 
No, would not 
Don’t know 
 
2. Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services? 
 
More than once a week 
Once a week 
Once or twice a month 
A few times a year 
Seldom 
Never 
Don’t know 
 
3. Are you personally a member of a local synagogue, mosque, temple, church, or other house of 
worship? 
 
Yes 
No 
Don’t know 
 
